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Technology licensing with strategic tax policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Technology licensing is an important element of conduct in many industries and has 
attracted a fair amount of attention in recent years. The seminal works by Kamien and 
Tauman (1984, 1986) show that, if an innovator, who is not a producer,
1 licenses a 
technology to the final goods producers and the product market is characterized by 
Cournot competition, licensing with output royalty generates lower profit to the 
innovator compared to fixed-fee licensing and auction, regardless of the industry size 
and/or magnitude of the innovation.
2 In the light of this theoretical result, the wide 
prevalence of output royalty in licensing contracts (see, e.g., Taylor and Silberstone, 
1973; Rostoker, 1984) remains a puzzle, and has drawn significant attention in 
explaining the superiority of royalty licensing over fixed-fee licensing or auction. The 
factors attributed to the presence of output royalty in a licensing contract offered by 
an outside innovator
3  include asymmetric information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; 
Beggs, 1992; Poddar and Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005b), Bertrand competition (Muto, 
1993), spatial competition (Poddar and Sinha, 2004), moral hazard (Macho-Stadler et 
                                                 
1 Licensing by the Universities or independent research labs to the producers may be the examples of 
this scenario.  
2 See Kamien (1992) for a nice survey of this literature. 
3 Outside innovator refers to the situation were the innovator (who is the licenser) and the licensees do 
not compete in the product market.   2
al., 1996; Choi, 2001), risk aversion (Bousquet et al., 1998), incumbent innovator 
(Shapiro, 1985; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007), leadership 
structure (Kabiraj, 2004), strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002), integer constraint on 
the number of licenses (Sen, 2005), input market power (Mukherjee, 2010) and 
convex costs (Mukherjee, 2010).
4 
While the existing works focus on several important aspects, they have been 
restrictive by not allowing for government policies. It is well known that, in an 
imperfectly competitive product market, a government may use tax policies to 
improve welfare by reducing the distortion created by imperfectly competitive 
product market (see, Myles, 1996; Hamilton, 1999). Hence, a more comprehensive 
treatment, focusing on the interaction between technology licensing contract and 
strategic tax policies, deserve attention. We take up this issue in this paper. 
  In a simple model with  1 n ≥  potential licensees facing zero opportunity costs, 
which corresponds to the case of drastic innovation in the sense of Arrow (1962), we 
show that, in the presence of strategic tax policy, an outside innovator prefers royalty 
licensing to auction if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. It follows 
                                                 
4 There is a related literature which shows the superiority of royalty licensing and licensing with a 
combination of fixed-fee and royalty when the licenser and the licensees compete in the product market 
(see, e.g., Rockett, 1990, Wang, 1998 and 2002, Wang and Yang, 1999, Filippini, 2001, Mukherjee and 
Balasubramanian, 2001, Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002, Fosfuri, 2004, Kabiraj, 2005, Poddar and 
Sinha, 2005 and Mukherjee, 2007). In this literature, the competition softening effect of output royalty 
may make the royalty licensing preferable than fixed-fee licensing if the licenser and the licensees 
compete in the product market.   3
from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable 
to the innovator as compared to royalty licensing or auction. 
More interestingly and in contrast to the previous works (see, e.g., Kamien and 
Tauman, 1986; Muto, 1993), we further show that the consumers can be better off 
under royalty licensing than under auction if the number of potential licensees is 
sufficiently large. This happens because the tax policy softens the output distortion 
effect of output royalty.  Thus, we show that strategic government tax policies can 
have a significant impact on the preference for royalty licensing, both for the outside 
innovator and the consumers. 
  We have written our results in terms of auction and royalty licensing. It is 
worth mentioning that, because of the zero opportunity cost of the licensees, which, in 
other words focus on the drastic innovation, there is no difference between auction 
and fixed-fee licensing in our analysis. Hence, the result we report under auction is 
also relevant for fixed-fee licensing. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model 
and derive the results in Section 2. Section 3 concludes.  
   4
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there is an innovator, denoted by I , who has invented a new product. 
However, I  cannot produce the good. There are  1 n ≥  symmetric potential producers 
of the product, and I   can license its technology to the potential producers. The 
innovation is assumed to be drastic, i.e., a producer cannot make profits using any 
pre-existing technology. A potential producer can produce at a marginal cost of c if it 
wins a license. To avoid analytical complexity, we ignore integer constraint and 
consider the number of potential producers as a continuous variable. 
Assume that the outputs of the producers are perfect substitutes, and the 
inverse market demand function is 
Paq = − ,       ( 1 )  
where P  is price of the product and q is the total output sold in the market.  
We consider the following licensing contracts that are designed byI : 
(i)  Royalty licensing, where a fixed royalty payment r  per unit of output is 
charged by I , and any producer who wishes to can purchase the license at 
this royalty rate.   
(ii)  Auctioning  k  licenses, 1 kn ≤ ≤ , by I   through a sealed bid English 
auction. The highest bidders obtain the license. The ties are resolved byI .   5
The innovator can also adopt a fixed-fee licensing contract, where the innovator 
charges a flat pre-determined license fee, F , and any producer who wishes to can 
purchase the license at this fixed-fee. However, it is immediate from Kamien et al. 
(1992) that the essential difference between auction and fixed-fee licensing stems 
from the difference in producers’ opportunity costs of having a license. Since we are 
considering a situation with zero opportunity costs of the producers, it follows that 
auction and fixed-fee licensing provide the same solution in this situation. Therefore, 
we focus on auction and do not consider the case of fixed-fee licensing separately.  
The implications of licensing with both fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty 
where the fixed-fee can be determined either by the innovator (i.e., fixed-fee plus 
royalty licensing) or it can be the winning bids of the licensees if the innovator 
auctions off licenses (i.e., auction plus royalty licensing) will follow easily from our 
analysis. 
We consider the following games for our analysis. Under royalty licensing, at 
stage 1, I   announces the uniform royalty rate, r. At stage 2, the producers 
simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to purchase a license. At 
stage 3, the government sets a per-unit tax, t, in order to maximize welfare of the 
economy. At stage 4, producers choose their outputs simultaneously. If only one 
producer purchases a license at stage 2, he produces like a monopolist at stage 4.    6
Under auction, at stage 1, I  announces to auction k  licenses, where 1 kn ≤≤. 
At stage 2, the producers simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to 
purchase a license, and how much to bid. At stage 3, the government sets a per-unit 
tax, t, in order to maximize welfare of the economy. At stage 4, the producers choose 
their outputs simultaneously. If I  auctions only one license, the licensee produces 
like a monopolist at stage 4. We solve these games by backward induction. 
  We consider a situation where the government cannot commit to the tax policy 
before licensing. This is in line with Mukherjee and Pennings (2006), where the 
government policy is announced after technology licensing, and can be motivated by 
the observation that government policies are often “time inconsistent”, meaning that 
governments have an incentive to reverse their pre-announced policies (Staiger and 
Tabellini, 1987). In a different context, Neary and Leahy (2000) question the ability 
of the governments to pre-commit to their policies. 
 
2.1. Royalty licensing 
Under royalty licensing, each licensee prefers to purchase a license for crta ++<, 
since the licensees always have the option to produce nothing after purchasing a 
license, thus earning zero profit, which is the opportunity cost of having a license.   7
First, we determine the product market equilibrium under royalty licensing. If 
I licenses the technology to n  producers and each of them pays a per-unit output 
royalty r and a per-unit output tax t, where crta + +< , the ith licensee,  1,2,..., in = , 
chooses his output to maximize the following expression: 
()
i
i q Max a q c r t q − −−− .      ( 2 )  
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  Now consider the decision of the government. The government determines t to 
maximize welfare, which is the “sum of consumer surplus, tax revenue and the total 
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The term δ  in (3) shows that there can be an asymmetry between social and private 
valuation of tax (Neary, 1994), and we assume that  1 δ > . Hence, δ  reflects  the 
distributional considerations of tax. 
We obtain the equilibrium tax rate as 
 
* ( )[( 1)( 1) 1] [( 1)( 1) ]
2( 1)( 1)
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Now solve the first stage of the game, where the innovator decides the royalty 
rate. While choosing the royalty rate, the innovator will internalize the effect of 
royalty on the government tax and the output of the licensees. The innovator 
maximizes the following expression to determine r: 
1
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The equilibrium output of the ith licensee is 
* ()












and the equilibrium payoff of I  is 
22
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2.2. Auction 
Now consider the game under auction. If I  auctions k  licenses, where 1 kn ≤≤, the 
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The equilibrium tax rate is 
 










.       ( 9 )  
It is immediate from (4) and (9) that the equilibrium tax is lower under royalty 
licensing than under auction. This strategic effect of the tax will play the important 
role in determining the innovator’s preference for a particular licensing contract. 
Since the output royalty distorts the output choice of the licensees, the government 
lowers the tax rate under royalty licensing compared to auction in order to soften the 
output distortion created by the royalty licensing. 
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. As mentioned   10
in Kamien et al. (1992), if kn = , I  can guarantee this equilibrium bid by specifying a 
minimum bid. However, for kn < , the producers bid these amounts even if I  does 
not specify the minimum bid. 
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 for  2 n ≥ . Hence, the innovator does not license to all 
the potential licensees under auction if  2 n ≥ . 
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2.3. Comparing auction with royalty licensing 
We obtain from (7) and (11) that the equilibrium profit of the innovator is higher 
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Proposition 1: The innovator is better off under royalty licensing than under auction 
if 
*() nn δ ≥ .   11
Proof: The result follows from (12). ■ 
 
As an example, consider  2 δ = . In this situation, it is immediate from 
*() n δ  
that the innovator’s profit is higher under royalty licensing than under auction if n ≥ 1. 
  The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. On the one hand, royalty 
licensing distorts the output decision of the licensees, which tend to reduce the profit 
of the innovator. On the other hand, royalty licensing (compared to auction) reduces 
the tax imposed by the government, thus tending to increase the output of the 
licensees, which, in turn, tends to increase the profit of the innovator. If the latter 
effect dominates the former effect, which happens in the presence of a large number 
of potential licensees, the innovator’s profit is higher under royalty licensing than 
under auction.  
We have considered that the innovator does not use royalty and fixed-fee 
together. It follows from the above analysis that the net profits of the licensees are 
positive under royalty licensing. Hence, it is trivial that the innovator prefers to use 
fixed-fee along with royalty to extract the entire profits of the licensees. While royalty 
provides the beneficial tax effect, auction helps to extract the entire surplus from the 
licensees. It is then intuitive that the innovator prefers auction plus royalty licensing 
over royalty licensing or auction. Under auction plus royalty, the innovator   12
determines the number of licenses to auction and the uniform royalty, r. Since the 
dominance of the auction plus royalty licensing is straightforward from the above 
analysis, we skip the mathematical details for this result. 
 
2.4. The effect on the consumers 
Now we are in position to see the effects of different licensing contracts on consumer 













































Proof: A straightforward comparison of 
* r CS  and 
* A CS  proves the result. ■     
 
As an example, consider that  2 δ = . In this situation, it follows from the 
condition shown in Proposition 2 that consumer surplus is higher under royalty 
licensing than under auction if n > 4. 
Since the tax rate is lower under royalty licensing than under auction, the tax 
policy tends to offset the negative output-distortion effect of the royalty licensing.   13
Hence, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large, royalty licensing can 
create higher total output compared to auction, thus making the consumers better off 
under royalty licensing compared to auction.  
Proposition 2 shows an important result that is in contrast to the common 
wisdom, viz., consumers are worse off under royalty licensing than auction or fixed-
fee licensing (Kamien and Tauman, 1986 and Muto, 1993).  
 
2.5. The implications of  1 δ =  
It is important to note that the above analysis is valid for  1 δ > . However, the results 
will be affected significantly when  1 δ = , i.e., if the social and private valuation of tax 
is the same. In this situation, the government can perfectly compensate the effect of 
the royalty rate and the number of licenses from the welfare point of view. If  1 δ = , 
we get that 
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A ta c = −−, since there is single license under 
auction. Therefore, under the royalty licensing, tax rate will adjust following the 




. Further, we find that 
the total outputs of the firms are the same under auction and under royalty licensing 
and it is given by  () qa c =−. Therefore, the product price is the same under royalty 
licensing and under auction if  1 δ = . Even if the total output of the firms are the same 
under both licensing contracts, more licenses under royalty licensing compared to   14
auction reduces the per-unit profit of the firms under the former licensing contract 
compared to the latter. 
If  1 δ = , under auction, the total profit of the licensee, which is also the profit 
of the innovator, is 
* * ()
A A aqc qtq Π= −− − . 
If  1 δ =   and there is royalty licensing, the royalty rate will be as high as 
possible, since the royalty rate will be determined by maximizing rq. Hence, the 
innovator will charge the royalty rate which satisfies 
* () ( )






tr t a c
n
−−
+= > = −−  for  n > 1, it is then immediate that the 
equilibrium profit of the innovator is higher under auction than under royalty 
licensing.   
 
3. Conclusion 
While technology licensing literature has considered several important aspects of 
today’s world, it has been restrictive by not allowing government policies. In this 
                                                 
5 It may worth noting that even if the innovator wants only one firm to purchase the license under 
royalty licensing and charges the royalty in anticipation of getting the royalty income as 
* ()
A rq a q c q t q =− − − , this royalty rate will encourage more than one licensee to purchase the 
license since, given the symmetry of the licensees and in the absence of any fixed cost associated with 
licensing, if a licensing contract is profitable to one licensee, it is also profitable to other licensees. 
Hence, under royalty licensing, we will obtain




+= , and the innovator will not be able 
to replicate the income earned under auction through the royalty contract. In order to replicate the 
income earned under auction through royalty licensing, the innovator also needs to specify the number 
of licenses under royalty licensing.   15
paper, we have shown that strategic government tax policies can have a significant 
impact on the preference for royalty licensing, both for the outside innovator and the 
consumers. More specifically, we show that, in the presence of strategic tax policies, 
an outside innovator and, more interestingly, the consumers are better off under 
royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee licensing) if the number of 
potential licensees is sufficiently large. It is immediate from our analysis that a 
combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator 
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